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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Petitioner,

:

v.

:

ERIC JARVIS WARREN,

:

Defendant/Respondent.

Case No. 20020002-SC

Priority No. 15

:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-2(3)(a) &-2(5) (1996 &
Supp. 2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Is the fact that traffic stops are inherently dangerous one of the "totality of the
circumstances " that must be examined in determining the reasonableness of a protective
frisk during a traffic stop?
On certiorari review, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of appeals, not
the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). The
court of appeals' decision is reviewed for correctness. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, f 8,
13 P.3d 576. "The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of

review." Id. The trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,
939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The trial
court's conclusions of law based on those findings are reviewed for correctness, "with a
measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of the legal standard to the
facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord Veteto, 2000 UT 62, at % 8.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTE AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine, both
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp.
1999); carrying a concealed knife, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-10-504 (1999); and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (R14-16).
Defendant moved to suppress the evidence (R43-44), (R49-56). Following an
evidentiary hearing and oral argument, the trial court denied the motion and entered
written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R64, 82-86). The trial court

2

determined that bnef questioning as to why defendant was in the area at that late hour did
not impermissibly extend the scope of the traffic stop (id.). Further, the trial court ruled
that the Terry frisk of defendant was justified by reasonable safety concerns given the
officer's suspicion that defendant had just engaged in drug or prostitution activity, the
lateness of the hour, the isolated downtown area, defendant's inconsistent explanation of
his activities (including his lie about the status of his license) and the need to impound
defendant's Cadillac (id.).
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to the cocaine charge and
was sentenced to an indeterminate statutory term of from zero-to-five years, to be served
consecutively to any term defendant was then serving (R108).
On direct appeal, a divided panel of the Utah Court of Appeals reversed. State v.
Warren, 2001 UT App 346,11,434 Utah Adv. Rep. 31. Observing that "iesser traffic
offenses' are not suggestive of weapons," and that neither the lateness of the hour nor
defendant's lie about the validity of his license individually raised safety concerns, the
majority concluded that the protective frisk was not justified by a reasonable suspicion
that defendant was armed. Id. at f 16, n.4.
Having determined that the frisk was unlawful, the majority declined to address
whether the stop was permissibly extended by the officer's brief questioning as to why
defendant was in the area at that late hour. Id. at f 16, n.5.

3

Finally, the majority declined to remand for the trial court to consider possible
application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Id. atfflf17-19.
The dissent concurred that the protective frisk was unjustified, but disagreed with
the majority's refusal to remand for consideration of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
A/, at U 26.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
At approximately 4:45 a.m., on 28 November 1999, Officer Swensen saw
defendant's Cadillac pulled over at 170 South, just north of the intersection, at 200 East
in Salt Lake City, Utah (R129:2-4). Defendant was in the driver's seat, and another
person was leaning into the openfrontpassenger door (R129:4). While the officer
watched, the person leaning into the Cadillac shut the door and walked away (id.).
Officer Swensen became suspicious of potential drug or prostitution activity because
there were no businesses open at that hour and no residences in the area (Rl29:4-5).
Thereafter, defendant pulled away and made a left turn and also changed lanes without
signaling (R 129:4). Officer Swensen stopped defendant for the traffic violations and
requested his license, registration, and insurance (R129:4, 14). Defendant provided
registration and his driver's license, which had expired in 1995 (id.). Defendant said he

l

On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of appeals and applies
the same standard of review applied by that court. State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 3,
985 P.2d 911. The court of appeals reviews the facts in the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court's ruling denying defendant's motion to suppress. State v.
Tetmeyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Utah App. 1997).
4

had a current license, but claimed it had been stolen (R129:6). Prior to running a
computer check, Officer Swensen briefly asked what defendant was doing in the area
(R129:7). Defendant said that he had just dropped an acquaintance off after being
together at someone's house (R129:8). Defendant also claimed to be looking for packing
boxes for this sister (Id.).
Officer Swensen returned to his patrol vehicle to check on defendant's license
(R129:17). The report indicated the renewal of defendant's license had been denied
because of unpaid reinstatement fees (R129:7). Officer Swensen therefore determined to
impound the Cadillac and to cite defendant for the traffic violations and for driving
without a license (R129:8). He asked defendant to step out of the Cadillac to accomplish
these purposes (id.).
As defendant stepped from the Cadillac, Officer Swensen asked if he had any
weapons and defendant said "No" (R129:19). The officer asked defendant to turn
around and put his hands on the back of his head in preparation for a Terry frisk:
"Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I perform a Terryfriskjust to see if there's
weapons. Also because of the fact that there being drug activity and prostitution and so
on, people that are involved in that usually carry weapons.. ."2 (R129:9, 19). During the
frisk, a white plastic twist of cocaine fell from defendant's waist (R129:20).

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5

Defendant was arrested on drug charges (id.). A search of defendant's person
incident to his arrest revealed more drugs and a glass pipe (R58). During an inventory
search of defendant's impounded Cadillac, police uncovered a knife concealed under the
armrest (R16).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The court of appeals' decision sends a conflicting and confusing message to lower
courts attempting to evaluate the reasonableness of a protective frisk performed during
the course of a traffic stop. First, the court of appeals ignores this Court's recognition
that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous. Second, the court of appeals fails to
reference or otherwise apply the mandatory totality of circumstances standard in its
evaluation of the protective frisk.
A proper evaluation of the totality of the circumstances confronting the officer in
this case, including the traffic stop context, defendant's immediately preceding activity,
the unusually early hour, the isolated downtown location, and defendant's lie about the
validity of his license, demonstrate that the protective frisk was reasonable. Even if a
corrected analysis would not change the result here, to avoid confusion in the lower
courts, this Court should reaffirm its recognition that all traffic stops are inherently
dangerous and that reviewing courts must take that factor into account when evaluating
the reasonableness of police conduct under the totality of the circumstances.
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ARGUMENT
THE FACT THAT TRAFFIC STOPS ARE INHERENTLY
DANGEROUS IS ONE OF THE "TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES" THAT MUST BE EXAMINED IN
DETERMINING THE REASONABLENESS OF A PROTECTIVE
FRISK DURING A TRAFFIC STOP
In State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, 37 P.3d 270, the court of appeals reversed
the trial court's determination that Officer Swensen's frisk of defendant was justified by
a reasonable suspicion that defendant was potentially armed. In so ruling, the court of
appeals held that "'lesser traffic offenses' are not suggestive of weapons" (quotation
omitted), and thus the fact that the frisk occurred in the context of a traffic stop is
irrelevant. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346, f 16, n.4. This view is at odds with this
Court's recognition that "concerns relating to officer safety" during traffic stops are
"inherent." State v. James, 2000 UT 80, J 10, n.3, 13 P.3d 576 (citing Knowles v. Iowa,
525 U.S. 13, 117-118 (1998) and Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-110
(1977)). See also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,414(1997).
Moreover, the court of appeals' refusal to acknowledge the above controlling
precedent illustrates that courts' over-arching failure to consider the totality of the
circumstances confronting Officer Swensen at the time of the frisk. See State v. Kohl,
2000 UT 35, K 11, 99 P.2d 7 ("While the required level of suspicion is lower than the
standard for probable cause to arrest, 'the same totality of facts and circumstances
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable facts" to
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support reasonable suspicion" (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (additional
citations omitted)). Indeed, the mandatory totality of circumstances standard, see United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002), is not referenced in the court
of appeals' opinion. See Warren, 2001 UT App 346, ff 9-16. Accordingly, this Court
should reverse and reaffirm that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous, and that this
inherent danger must be considered in determining the reasonableness of police conduct.
The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness. "The touchstone of [an]
analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal security.'"
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 108-09 (1977) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19). In other words,
"[t]he Fourth Amendment is n o t . . . a guarantee against all searches and seizures, but
only against unreasonable searches and seizures." United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675,
681(1985). As noted above, in determining the propriety of a particular detention, or in
this case, a protective frisk, the reviewing court must consider the totality of the
circumstances confronting the officer at the time. See Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750
("When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the 'totality of the
circumstances' of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 'particularized and
objective basis' for suspecting legal wrongdoing") (citation omitted). See also State v.
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 (Utah 1987) (recognizing that courts must view totality of
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circumstances in determining reasonable suspicion). Arvizu emphasizes that the totality
of circumstances review "allows officers to draw on their own experience and
specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative
information available to them that 'might well elude an untrained person.'" Id. at
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,418 (1981).
Additionally, given the dangers inherent in all traffic stops, police are entitled to
take reasonable precautionary actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic
investigation. James, 2000 UT 80, ^f 10 (citing Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111); State v.
O 'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah App. 1998). See also United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d
1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 2001) {en banc). Indeed, "[o]wing to the inherent safety concerns
and the limited nature of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle to
leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation." James, 2000 UT 80, f 10 (citing
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-111). As further recognized by this Court, ""[i]t is clear that the
safety concerns guiding the Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any
particular showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique circumstances
of a given automobile stop,... but rather are of an inherent and general nature." James,
2000 UT 80, f 10. Recognizing the inherent danger in all traffic stops, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals recently held that police do not need a particularized suspicion that the
occupants of a vehicle are armed and dangerous before they may ask about the presence
of loaded weapons. Holt, 264, F.3d at 1225.

9

Considering the Totality of the Circumstances the Instant Protective Fri

was

Justified. Notwithstanding the inherent danger, the usual motorist stopped for traffic
violations is not ordinarily subjected to a protective frisk. Here, the court of appeals'
flawed analysis resulted in that court's failure to recognize that defendant was not the
usual motorist. First, Officer Swensen observed more than just the traffic violations
which served as the basis for the stop. He also saw an unidentified individual leaning
into defendant's passenger side door from the curb for no apparent legitimate reason,
given the deserted downtown location and the unusually early hour (R 129:4-5, 15).
Based on the officer's experience, that behavior, at that hour, and in that location, was
consistent with a possible drug or prostitution offense (id.). See Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750751. It is well established that otherwise innocent actions may aggregate into reasonable
suspicion. Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 751 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). Moreover,
defendant's suspicious conduct immediately preceded the traffic violations for which he
was ultimately stopped (R129:4-5, 15).
Second, defendant initially produced a driver's license that had expired four years
earlier and then lied to Officer Swensen, claiming that he had a current license, but that it
had recently been stolen (Rl29:6-7). Upon learning from dispatch that defendant in fact
had no valid license, Officer Swensen determined the Cadillac would have to be
impounded (R 129:9).
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Finally, while Officer Swensen did not suspect that defendant was necessarily
carrying a weapon when he asked him to stepfromCadillac (R129:19), it was his
experience that traffic stops are potentially dangerous (R129:9). Officer Swensen's
concern was both real and reasonable. "In 1994 alone, there were 5, 672 officer assaults
and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413.
Moreover, approximately 30% of police shootings occur when an officer approaches a
suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see
also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 (1973) (FBI report indicates that
11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month period were killed when the officers
were making a traffic stop); W. LaFave, 4 Search and Seizure, § 9.5(a), at 254-255 n.33
(3rd ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while conducting field interrogations than while
dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer shootings occurring pursuant to a vehicle
stop take place after the initial contact has been made). Utah is not immunefromthe
national trend. See Angie Welling, Officer's death shocks Lehi, Deseret News, August 5,
2001, at A1 (copy attached). See, e.g., State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ff 2-5, 994 P.2d 177
(passenger in traffic stop shoots at officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his
hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without
warning as officer approached vehicle).
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In sum, viewing the circumstances confronting Officer Swensen at the time of the
frisk as a whole, including consideration of the fact that all traffic stops are potentially
dangerous, defendant's suspicious behavior immediately prior to the stop, and his lie
about the validity of his driver's license after the stop, it cannot be said that the officer
acted unreasonably in frisking defendant for weapons before proceeding to impound the
Cadillac. Moreover, the measure of discretion to be accorded the trial court's decision
below compels affirmance under a proper application of the totality of circumstances
standard. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936-939 (Utah 1994); State v. Veteto, 2000
UT62,t8,6P.3dll33.
The Court of Appeals Erroneously Rejected Specific Circumstances of This
Traffic Stop in Isolation From Each Other. Rather than viewing the above
circumstances collectively, the court of appeals erroneously viewed them in isolation
from each other. For example, the court of appeals notes that '"lesser traffic offenses'
are not suggestive of weapons. Nor is the lateness of the hour. Similarly, lying about the
status of one's driver's license does not suggest the presence of weapons." Warren, 2001
UT App 346, f 17 n.4. The court of appeals' cursory analysis is similar to the "divideand-conquer" approach the United States Supreme Court rejected in Arvizu. 122 S.Ct. at
750.
In Arvizu, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals evaluated and rejected in isolation
from each other several factors that border patrol agents relied on in determining that
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Arvizu was engaged in illicit trafficking. Id. Criticizing the Ninth Circuit's approach,
the Supreme Court observed that the lower court "appeared to believe that each
observation by [the agent] that was by itself readily susceptible to an innocent
explanation was entitled to "'no weight.'" Id. (citation omitted). The Supreme Court
reaffirmed that Terry "precludes this sort of divide-and-conquer analysis." Arvizu, 122
S.Ct. at 750. Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he officer in Terry observed
the petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back and forth, look into a store
window, and confer with one another. Although each of the series of acts was 'perhaps
innocent in itself,' we held that, taken together, they 'warranted further investigation.'"
Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22). See also United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (holding that factors which by themselves are "consistent"
with innocence collectively constitute reasonable suspicion).
*

*

*

Based on the above, this Court should reverse the court of appeals and clarify that
the danger inherent in all traffic stops is a necessary consideration in any evaluation of
the reasonableness of police conduct during a traffic stop, and that the circumstances
must be considered as a totality. James, 2000 UT 80, f 10, n.3. See Mimms, 434 U.S. at
108-109 ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always
'reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a
citizen's personal security'" (emphasis added)). The court of appeals' failure to consider

13

this salient fact under the totality of circumstances standard resulted in that court's failure
to recognize that the protective frisk was a reasonable safety precaution. However, even
if correction of the court of appeals' analysis does not change the result here, the
confusion in the lower courts will remain unless this Court reaffirms James's recognition
that all traffic stops are inherently dangerous and that reviewing courts must take that
factor into account when evaluating the reasonableness of police conduct under the
totality of the circumstances. 2000 UT 80, f 10, n.3; Arvizu, 122 S.Ct. at 750.
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals' conflicting and confusing analysis should be reversed and
remanded.3
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on _ / July 2002.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

3

While the majority also rejected the State's argument that the frisk was
alternatively justified under the inevitable discovery doctrine, remand is necessary
because the court of appeals did not address the issue whether the officer's brief
questioning unduly prolonged the traffic stop prior to the frisk. See rjrarren, 2001 UT
App346,f 16n.5,f 22.
14
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Addendum A

deseretnews.com
Deseret News, Sunday, August 05, 2001

Officer's death shocks Lehi
These kind of things don't happen here,' resident says

By Angie Welling with Gib Twyman, Sharon Haddock and Brady Snyder
Deseret News staff writers

LEHI — Word of the death of police officer Joseph D. Adams in the line of duty spread
slowly through this small Utah County town Saturday. And when the news hit, it hit hard.
"This'll be a hard time for Lehi," predicted Assistant
Fire Chief Bret Hutchings, swiping gently at his
tear-filled eyes. "You think little Lehi, these things
just don't happen."
Flags throughout the community of 19,000 flew at
half-staff Saturday as investigators continued to
examine the Friday night gunfight that left Adams
dead and another man critically injured. Details
remain sketchy, for police are releasing little
information.

Wayne Keith, left, Doug Fannen and
Ford Fannen, friends of slain Lehi
police officer Joseph D, Adams, scrub
blood Saturday from the roadside
where Adams was shot.

From Hutchings' family-owned appliance store just Scott G. Winterton, Deseret News
two blocks from the empty police station — Utah
County deputy sheriffs patrolled the town Saturday to allow Lehi officers time to grieve in
private — he spoke fondly about the 26-year-old man killed during what began as a routine
traffic stop.
"He's the kind of guy that gave everybody a fair shake," Hutchings said. "He did the police
job so well. He was well-liked by everybody."
Three of Adams'friendsspent the afternoon cleaning the bloodfromthe road where the
officer died.
This is an honor to come here and do this for Joe. He was my best friend," said Doug
Fannen as he and two others used bleach and scouring pads to remove blood stainsfromthe
pavement.
Adams had served on Lehi's 26-member police force for three years. He leaves behind a wife,
Cydney, and an 8-month-oid son.
"You feel he's got to be in a better place than here, but it's so sad for his young family,"
Hutchings said. "And that's where our hearts will be."

http://deseretnews.com/dn/print/1,1442,295015 772,00.html?

8.1401

Family members at Adams' Orem home on Saturday declined to comment when contacted
bv the Deseret News.
Lehi Police Chief Karl Zimmerman said Adams will be missed.
"It's bad," Zimmerman said about the mood within his
department. "Everybody s really hurting."
According to police, Adams stopped a suspected drunken driver
at 2100 N. 1200 West just before 11 p.m. Friday. Adams
reportedly ticketed the man for DUI and asked him to step out
of his vehicle. In the process of being handcuffed, the man was
somehow able to free one hand, grab a small handgun and begin
shooting, Utah County Sheriffs Sgt. Dennis Harris said.

Joseph D. Adams leaves
behind a wife and son.
Associated Press

A wounded Adams was still able to shoot the assailant
numerous times before the man got into his car and drove away
with Adams' handcuffs dangling from one wrist.
Police have identified the man as Arturo Javier Scott Welch, 23,

West Valley City.
Adams was shot at least twice, once on the left side of his chest a mere fraction of an inch
above his protective vest, and once in the leg. He was flown by medical helicopter to LDS
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 12:13 a.m. Saturday.
Shortly after the shooting, Salt Lake County sheriffs deputies arrested Welch at a gas station
at 11400 S. State in Draper. A license plate check on the red Chevrolet Cavalier Welch drove
some 15 miles from Lehi to Draper indicates the vehicle was not registered to Welch. Police
would not release information about the owner of the vehicle.
Welch was also airlifted to LDS Hospital, where he remained in critical condition Saturday
night with multiple gunshot wounds to the abdomen, spokesman Jess Gomez said.
A search of court records indicates Welch was cited
in April with a class B misdemeanor DUI and four
class C misdemeanors, including driving with an
open container. He pleaded not guilty to those
charges in July, and an Aug. 17 pretrial conference
is scheduled in that caseIn 1996, Welch also pleaded guilty to fleeing from a
peace officer and possession of alcohol by a minor,
both class B misdemeanors. A third misdemeanor
count of vehicle burglary was dismissed.
Friday night, a passenger exited Welch's vehicle
sometime during the gunfight. The man, whom

Jeremy Eiswood places flowers near
where fellow officer Joseph D. Adams
was slain.
Scoff G. Winterton, Deseret Sews
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police hd\ e identified only as an "acquaintance' of Welch, dialed 911 on his ceil phone dnc
waited for police to arrive.
Harris described the man, who was questioned and released Saturday morning, as Very
forthcoming. I believe he's helped out the detectives quite a bit."
Officers arrived almost immediately and began performing CPR on Adams within minutes,
said Hutchings, who was among the emergency personnel called to the emotional scene.
"There was a lot of crying going on here last night, from the chief on down," Hutchings said.
"None of us wanted to leave the scene. We just kind of stood there in amazement."
State Sen. John Valentine, R-Orem, said his community is feeling a deep sense of loss over
the slain officer. So is the Utah County Sheriffs Search and Rescue Team, of which Valentine
is a part.
"Our unit is fairly somber right now. One of our lieutenants was among thefirston the scene
and administered CPR to Officer Adams, so it's hitting him especially hard," Valentine said.
"We had a training exercise at Bridal Veil Falls (Saturday) morning, and it was extremely
difficult for everyone to get going, thinking about another peace officer being shot."
State and county counseling teams are coordinating
efforts to assist officers, dispatchers and staff
members in dealing with the shock.
The entire town of Lehi is dazed, convenience store
clerk Karla Glodowski said. The shooting dominated
conversations inside the store all day Saturday, she
said.
Mourners embrace where Lehi police
officer Joseph D. Adams was shot and

"You have to keep hearing about it before it sinks in
because it's still a small town," Glodowski said.

killed Friday night.
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Jason Olson. Deseret Sews
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Adams' death comes less than a month after similar tragedy rocked another small Utah
town.
Roosevelt Police Chief Cecil Gurr was shot and killed July 6 after responding to a domestic
dispute in a convenience store parking lot. Lee Roy Wood, Vernal, is charged with capital
murder and could face the death penalty.
"I think the citizens of Utah should really take this as a warning. We're a state that's growing,
and with that increase brings good people and bad people," Harris said. "This is a wake-up
call to the citizens of Utah and to the police officers of Utah."
Lehi City Councilman Johnny Barnes agreed and issued a call that
Adams' death not be in vain.
"I want it to be a wake-up call for people, a motivation to get on the ball,
http://deseretnews.eom/dn/print/l,1442,2950l5772,00.html?
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get imoKed. teach our Kids, not just point fingers." Barnes said. 'I think
we can use this to uplift and help by getting involved in service."
Valentine said anytime a police officer goes down it creates shock waves
both for law-abiding citizens and the peace-keeping fraternity —
especially with the recent spate of fatal shootings.

Arturo Javier
Scott Welch

"We are grieved at the loss of yet another officer in the line of duty/1 Valentine said. "Being a
police officer is a veryriskyendeavor. Every time he or she goes out, they face this
possibility.
"And yet they do keep going out because they are professionals. Now we've lost one of our
own out of our city, and it is hard to find the words to express how extremely upsetting it is
to us all."
An Arts in the Parks "Country Showcase" program scheduled for tonight has been dedicated
to Adams and the sacrifice he made for the community. The event will start at 7 p.m. in
Wines Park, 600 N. 100 East in Lehi. A trust fund for Adams' family has been established at
the Lehi branch of the Bank of American Fork. Donations can be made by calling the bank at
766-1000.
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